Some Critical Questions for Paul Bramadat's,

The Church on the World's Turf



David Seljak, St. Jerome's University

May 24, 2001

Laval University, Ste-Foy, Quebec

* * *



Paul Bramadat's book, The Church on the World's Turf: An Evangelical Christian Group at a Secular University, is a social scientific account of the vitality of the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. Bramadat tells us the IVCF at McMaster is the largest and most active in Canada, comprising 200 students of various conservative Christian denominations on a campus of about 14,000. Consciously choosing a dialogical model for his study and making plain his own "voice" throughout the book, Bramadat adopts a post modern ethnography in order to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism which he laments in other studies of conservative envangelicalism. In this short presentation, I wish to compare Bramadat's approach to that of Edmund Sullivan in his book A Critical Psychology: An Interpretation of the Personal World (New York: Plenum, 1984). Like Bramadat, Sullivan rejects positivism and sees social scientific accounts as translations from one social world to another. However, Sullivan goes further to situate his psychology of soccer hooliganism in England in the social context of his day and asks pointed political questions about the practical implications of psychology as a discipline and scholarship in general, especially focusing on the values that animate the questions we ask and how we go about answering them. I will use Gregory Baum's short essay "Remarks of a Theologian in Dialogue with Sociology", part of the conference proceedings Theology and the Social Sciences edited by Michael Barnes and distributed to the panel participants by Don Stoesz to raise some questions for Paul and for the panel and group to discuss.

In his book A Critical Psychology, Edmund Sullivan uncovers the values behind the dominant paradigms in psychology and argues that the discipline must give up it pretensions to "value-free", scientific objectivity in favour of a dialogical stance towards its "objects" of study, who are, after all, "subjects" that is fellow humans. He does not suggest that we give up on the scientific method completely but proposes that we shuttle between the scientific method and involved, hermeneutical interpretation. Social scientific accounts would be seen as "resymbolizations" of phenomena, or translations into a particular and useful vocabulary. To be critical, such an account would have to meet the following criteria:

negotiable: no pretensions to absolute truth or objectivity;

presented as an argument advocated by an interested party; presented as the most plausible or valid interpretation based on explicit criteria;

emancipatory in its praxis: here he relies on Marx to suggest that an interpretation of the world not only interprets a phenomenon but suggests an action towards it and finally,

critical: it must reflect the power and abilities of humans as agents and expose impediments to freedom.

Sullivan proposes these criteria to combat what Gregory Baum calls the "mood of positivism" that dominates the social sciences. Like Sullivan, Baum argues that the dominant approach to religion has two main flaws. First, it disregards the human agency of the subjects of study, hiding the creative and pro-active nature of their religious commitment. Second, it allows scholars to hide the value commitments latent in their work (6). Values help to determine, Baum writes,

the question the researcher asks. What one studies reveals the values of institution or researcher.

the intention of the overall research project; this provides the energy required to complete a work-intensive project.

the paradigm around which the researcher organizes the empirical data; and Sullivan shows very effectively how paradigms operate out of specific metaphors (mechanical, biological, etc.: the brain as computer for example) that are rooted in values. and

the relationship of the researcher to the subjects; will the research operate under a dialogical or monological model? will she or he attempt to be coldly analytical or empathetic?

In terms of Sullivan's criteria, Bramadat is clearly presenting his work both as negotiable and as "subjective". His interpretations, he admits, are his own. He is constantly present throughout the work, never allowing the reader to imagine that the description is anything but his own observation and interpretation. There are implicit values behind this approach as Baum reminds us. As a praxis, it is marked by an innate pluralism and decency. It treats conservative evangelical Christian students as equals, "subjects", the authors of their lives rather than objects, the passive victims of powerful social forces. On the scientific level, it is more open to new data and is, arguably, more effective in inspiring subjects to share more freely and honestly with the researcher. This approach allows Bramadat to interpret conservative Evangelical students as "religious and cultural innovators".

Operating out of this model, Bramadat describes the life of IVCF students, their distinctive rhetoric, their attempts to deal with their estrangement and marginalization at a secular university, their understanding of the role of women, their belief in the spiritual realm and Satan, and witnessing at McMaster and in Lithuania. Bramadat's work is carefully researched, clearly written, and grounded in a firm grasp of the theoretical state of the question on ethnography and the relevance of his study for its resolution. Like Sullivan, he defines his task as a translation, translating the specific behaviours and attitudes of conservative Christians into the more publicly accessible (read secular) metaphors.

Instead of reducing these behaviours and attitudes to social or psychological deprivation, etc., Bramadat compares them to the negotiation of contracts, that is, contracts of behaviour between the Christian students and their secular counterparts. We won't disrupt classes on the theory of evolution but we won't buy into the model. We won't preach to you about the evils of liquor and premarital sex but we won't participate in your drunken orgies either. We will witness to the saving power of a personal relation with Jesus but only in approved ways, that is, "friendship evangelism". He argues that the IVCF operates as a kind of permeable membrane between the students and their surrounding secular culture, allowing these acts of negotiation. Unlike many studies that focus only on the "fortress" function of such membranes (insulating conservative Christians against the dominant secular culture), Bramadat's book also looks at the "bridge" function of the IVCF. This organization thrives not only because it protects conservative Christians from secular society. It also encourages safe and friendly contact with non-Christians in the classroom, residences, and other settings.

It is Bramadat's refusal to rush towards a reductionistic explanation of religion that allows his to develop this more sophisticated or "thick" description of what is going on. The project is not without its dangers. For example, in his discussion on conversions (51), Bramadat accepts neither the reductionistic interpretations of social scientists nor the "black box" interpretations of the students themselves. He refuses, he writes, to "subsume IVCF participants' postulations of the ontological independence of God and the veracity of the Bible as symbolic fulfilments of essentially psychological needs." While his study proposes a social scientific rather than theological interpretation, Bramadat is "inclined to allow the evangelical and social-scientific truth claims to coexist, albeit distinctively and uneasily, throughout this study" (51). He risks alienating the Christians he is studying and the social scientist to whom he addresses his work. In the end, Bramadat's courage pays off and he produces a more satisfactory explanation than had he given too much to either side.

Is it emancipatory in its praxis? Is it critical?

The dialogical model implicit in this "post-modern" ethnography is the most suitable for dealing with the conservative Christians at McMaster, just as it is with the benevolent elements of every tradition. As noted above, Bramadat treats the subjects of his study with dignity and respect, attitudes missing in the condescending tone of many reductionistic accounts. In this respect, his work highlights and celebrates human agency and creativity. However, this method cannot be the only one that social scientists are allowed to use, a point Bramadat misses in his enthusiasm for postmodern ethnography. For example, this kind of dialogical method would be most inappropriate if Bramadat did his ethnographic study on a racist group. One example should illustrate my point. In his preface, Bramadat responds to the group's feeling that had he understood their truth completely, he would have become a Christian himself; he writes: "…I tried throughout this project to remain both intellectually and emotionally open to their Lord, but in the end I did not feel drawn into a relationship with Jesus." Now, if I were to study the Ku Klux Klan, for example, would I have to remain intellectually and emotionally open to racism? The very act of dialogue here lends racists an air of respectability.

In studying such "pathological" movements or societies, social scientists have to adopt a much more "monological" model. Here, even positivistic and reductionist accounts will be more helpful. Granted, social scientists will want to remain self-critical and open to correction but, at the level of foundational commitment to human equality and dignity, there can be no compromise or negotiation. Without this kind of commitment, a critical social science is impossible.

Now in his study, Bramadat is not looking at a racist or fascist group. Hence the dialogical approach, with its patient, self-critical mood, is the most appropriate. However, I think that Bramadat makes a mistake in limiting himself to it alone. There are two reasons for this. First, the social location of conservative Christians is ambiguous. Historically, Christianity has been the favoured religion in Canada, officially established (but never successfully) for short periods. Even after the failure of establishment, the Christian churches enjoyed the privileges of a "social establishment", that is, they had great power and influence over culture and many institutions. Governments passed laws protecting Church property and privileges, prohibiting work on the Lord's Day, implementing Christian morality with regards to sexual behaviour and the consumption of alcohol. Only very recently has this power faded. Are conservative evangelicals really an ostracized minority? Or are they a rearguard and reactionary element in the Christian churches who refuses to admit that the privileges formerly enjoyed by Christians were illegitimate, unfair, discriminatory, and undemocratic? Should they be studied sympathetically (as Bramadat does) or critically (as Sullivan would do)? Or both?

Bramadat is aware that conservative evangelicalism has victimized others and his attitude of tolerance and patience is tested. There were two points where I thought he was too patient: the conservative evangelical attitude to women's leadership and the condescending attitude to other religions (either explicitly expressed or implied in evangelization efforts). In the latter case, he notes that he was personally affronted by the sometimes condescending tone in the attempts to convert him undertaken by certain members of the group. However, moved by their sincerity and depth of their concern, Bramadat was willing to be patient with them. He becomes less patient when he discusses their condescending attitude to Lithuanian Catholics (136). But this is as far as he goes. I would have gently, but persistently, analyzed their condescension in terms of a "memory" or "echo" of the xenophobic and racist history of Christian missionary activity as well as current centre/periphery (first world/second world) dynamics (those in the centre always maintain a studied disinterest in the culture and history of those in the periphery, as Rick Mercer's interviews with American subjects on "This Hour has 22 Minutes" demonstrate). In a critical dialogue, the emancipatory commitment inspires us to criticize even our friends. Here a reductionistic approach would have given us insights that the dialogical approach could not.

On the question of women's equality, again I would say that Bramadat's patience went too far. Wisely, he does not simply jump in with a ready-made conclusion about the barriers to women's agency and dignity created by a certain expression of Christian culture. Moreover, I agree with his insightful analysis of three strategies that conservative evangelical women might employ regarding this question (101). However, I feel that his description is too optimistic. Bramadat writes, "In short, with the help of the IVCF, these women have developed complex, innovative, and empowering strategies that allow them to remain loyal to evangelicalism and, in their words, "stretched" by the liberal educational institutions that more and more of them are deciding to attend" (101). While I think this conclusion is a valuable corrective to the deterministic and one-sided conclusion of many authors, I would ask if feminist scholars are not at least partially right about the limitations imposed on women by Christianity? Are these strategies really that effective? Or are they signs and symptoms of alienation? And if so, why not mention it here. Respectfully, carefully, but plainly.

Another area of conservative Christian belief and behaviour not touched by Bramadat is the attitude towards homosexuals. Even though this has been an issue that has traditionally set conservative evangelicals apart from their secular, university-educated peers, curiously Bramadat never questions them on it. Is the typical conservative evangelical attitude to homosexuality present in the McMaster chapter of the IVCF? If so, how is it expressed? Do IVCF students differ from their peers on the question? How is this difference negotiated? Such questions would have provided a very clear illustration of the dynamic Bramadat describes so well throughout the book. Furthermore, it could have led to a discussion about how a group that is marginalized itself, marginalizes others. Would we interpret fidelity to a long-held Canadian moral judgment as the valiant attempt of a marginalized group to retain an authentic sense of self-identity? Or is it a rearguard action by part of an elite that has lost considerable social power to re-establish its right to dictate public morality to all. Knowing Bramadat, he might tolerate the former but would certainly condemn the latter.

Clearly such critical questions would have strained the friendly dialogue that Bramadat worked so hard to establish. Perhaps he should have remembered that old saying, "It may be important to be nice, but it's nicer to be important." The dialogical model implicit in his "post-modern" ethnography has its own liberal commitments, presuppositions, and values. These are revealed when we ask what do we tolerate before we shut down the dialogue? Racism? Sexism? Homophobia? Violence? On pages 136ff., Bramadat is unwilling to tolerate xenophobia; on page 101, he is willing to tolerate what I would see as a degree of sexism. On the traditional attitude of conservative Christians to homosexuality, he is silent. I realise that all of these judgments and terms themselves are open to "deconstruction". But Sullivan would remind us that every account is also a praxis and so, practically speaking, even the open-minded tolerance of post-modern ethnography has consequences that are not politically irrelevant. Unless you are willing to be "open to" Nazism, apartheid, racism, Stalinism, ideological capitalism, etc., you have to impose limits. What are the limits to Bramadat's tolerance?

Theology and the Social Sciences

Because this is a joint session of the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion and the Canadian Theological Society, I will conclude by turning to the theme of "The Role of the Social Sciences in Theology". Theologians, as noted by several of the authors in the book edited by Michael Barnes, often turn to the social sciences to understand the world and themselves. They will want to use both types of social scientific studies. Ethnographic studies rooted in the dialogical model are most useful to them in terms of inter-religious dialogue or in understanding totally secular groups. The values that this model promotes are useful in those contexts. However, many theologians will find themselves in situations where toleration is not a virtue. Theologians in South Africa interpreted the emergence of apartheid and Afrikaaner nationalism in terms of power relations, not as the product of "religious and cultural innovators" (which the early Afrikaaners certainly were).

Like theologians, social scientists have to be sensitive to the broader socio-political contexts in which their subjects operate and in which they themselves write. In this insightful and worthwhile book, Bramadat is partially successful in his effort to locate conservative evangelicals and himself in the context of Canadian society. A broader historical focus would have raised the issue of the ambiguous social location of conservative evangelicals. So too would a deeper socio-economic analysis. While marginalized culturally, the conservative Christians Bramadat studied enjoy many privileges. They are not poor; they are better educated than most Canadians. They encounter very few special barriers to participation at the very highest levels of the free-market system and the liberal democratic political institutions. I would have liked to see Bramadat discuss his metaphors of fortress and bridge as those functions allow conservative evangelicals to participate in a free market economy and liberal democracy while distancing themselves from the inherent social consequences of the individualism, social mobility, and erosion of community caused by those institutions.

While Bramadat is right to understand the conservative Christians at McMaster to be "religious and cultural innovators" or "bricoleurs", that is active agents "who work with the symbolic materials and tools at hand to create something new" rather than passive victims of socialization, it would have been best to note that every culture generates its own victims and that conservative evangelical Christianity has done the same. "Othered" itself (I may never forgive Bramadat for turning this into a verb), it in turn "others" others. It is to this process that a critical social science must be attentive and it can do so only by using a multiplicity of models and approaches.

* * *